Information about:
Philip J. Reny

Other registered authors

Email:
Homepage: http://home.uchicago.edu/~preny/
Postal Address:
Phone:

Affiliation

• Department of Economics
  University of Chicago

  Location: Chicago, Illinois (United States)
  Homepage: http://economics.uchicago.edu/
  Email:
  Phone:
  Fax: 773/702-8490
  Postal: 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637
  Handle: RePEc:edi:deuchus (registered authors at this institution)

Lists

1. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
2. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
3. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
4. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
5. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
6. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
7. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
8. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors

Working papers

1. Philip J Reny, 2005. "On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000413, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Philip J Reny, 2005. "On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 784828000000000413, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
   • Philip J. Reny, 2005. "On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000067, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

2. Reny, Phil & Robson, Arthur, 2004. "Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views," Micro Theory Working Papers robson-04-02-12-12-44-46, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 12 Feb 2004. [Downloadable!]
   Published as:
   • Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 2004. "Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 355-384, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

3. Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2002. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp292, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
   Published as:
   • Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2004. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1105-1125, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

4. Perry, M. & Reny, P.J., 1995. "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Papers 9581, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
   Published as:
   • Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J., 1999. "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 279-285, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

5. Reny, P.J. & Bhattacharya, U. & Spiegel, M., 1993. "Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9318, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
   Published as:
   • Bhattacharya Utpal & Reny Philip J. & Spiegel Matthew, 1995. "Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 136-170, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

6. Reny, P.J. & Winter, E. & Wooders, M.H., 1993. "The Partenered Core of a Game With Side Payments," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9317, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
   Other versions:
   • Reny,Philip & Winter,Eyal & Wooders,Myrna, . "The partnered core of a game with side payments," Discussion Paper Serie B 258, University of Bonn, Germany.

7. McAfee, R. Preston & Reny, Philip J., 1990. "A Stone-Weierstrass Theorem without Closure under Suprema," Working Papers 727, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]

1. Reny, P.J., 2008. "2004 World Congress Special Issue," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 431-434, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

2. R. McAfee & Philip Reny, 2007. "The role of excess capacity in determining market power in natural gas transportation markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 209-223, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

3. Philip J Reny & Motty Perry, 2006. "Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1231-1269, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

4. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 2005. "An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 72(2), pages 567-592, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

5. Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2004. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1105-1125, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2002. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp292, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]

6. Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 2004. "Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 355-384, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Reny, Phil & Robson, Arthur, 2004. "Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views," Micro Theory Working Papers robson-04-02-12-12-44-46, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 12 Feb 2004. [Downloadable!]

7. Reny, Philip J., 2003. "The Collected Papers of Robert J. Aumann: Robert J. Aumann, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000. Vol. 1, 720 pp; Vol. 2, 672 pp," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 327-332, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

8. Govindan, Srihari & Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 2003. "A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 369-374, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

9. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 2002. "An Efficient Auction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1199-1212, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

10. Philip J. Reny & Arthur J. Robson, 2002. "Existence of subgame perfect equilibrium with public randomization: A short proof," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(24), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]

11. Reny, Philip J., 2001. "Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 99-105, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

12. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J., 1999. "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 279-285, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Perry, M. & Reny, P.J., 1995. "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Papers 9581, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.

13. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On The Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 895-900, July.

14. Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.

15. Reny, Philip J. & Holtz Wooders, Myrna, 1998. "An extension of the KKMS theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 125-134, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

16. Kohlberg, Elon & Reny, Philip J., 1997. "Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 280-313, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

17. Reny, Philip J. & Holtz Wooders, Myrna, 1996. "The Partnered Core of a Game without Side Payments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 298-311, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

18. Harris, Christopher & Reny, Philip & Robson, Arthur, 1995. "The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 507-44, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

19. Bhattacharya Utpal & Reny Philip J. & Spiegel Matthew, 1995. "Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 136-170, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Reny, P.J. & Bhattacharya, U. & Spiegel, M., 1993. "Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9318, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.

20. Philip J. Reny, 1995. "Rational Behaviour in Extensive-Form Games," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 1-16, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

21. Elmes Susan & Reny Philip J., 1994. "On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-23, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

22. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Perry, M. & Rany, P., 1992. "A Non-Cooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9203, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.

23. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 257-274, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

24. Perry Motty & Reny Philip J., 1993. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 50-77, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

25. Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Rationality in Extensive-Form Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 103-18, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

26. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

27. Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 627-49, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

28. Hellwig, Martin & Leininger, Wolfgang & Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 1990. "Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 406-422, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

29. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John & Reny, Philip J, 1989. "Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1451-59, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

30. Chow, Gregory C. & Reny, Philip J., 1985. "On two methods for solving and estimating linear simultaneous equations under rational expectations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-75, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2003-05-15 2005-09-17 2006-03-18 Author is listed
2. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2003-05-15 Author is listed
3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2005-09-17 2006-03-18 Author is listed

This page was last updated on 2009-7-1.