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Philip J. Reny

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This is information that was supplied by Philip Reny in registering through RePEc. If you are Philip J. Reny , you may change this information at the RePEc Author Service. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at the RePEc Author Service. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Personal Details

First Name: Philip
Middle Name: J.
Last Name: Reny
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pre196

Email:
Homepage: http://home.uchicago.edu/~preny/
Postal Address:
Phone:

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Chicago
Location: Chicago, Illinois (United States)
Homepage: http://economics.uchicago.edu/
Email:
Phone:
Fax: 773/702-8490
Postal: 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637
Handle: RePEc:edi:deuchus (more details at EDIRC)

Lists

This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations or Wikipedia entries:
  1. Philip J. Reny in Wikipedia (English)

Works

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Working papers

  1. P. Reny, 2010. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 386, David K. Levine.
  2. Philip J Reny, 2005. "On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000413, David K. Levine.
  3. Reny, Phil & Robson, Arthur, 2004. "Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views," Microeconomics.ca working papers robson-04-02-12-12-44-46, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 12 Feb 2004.
  4. Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2002. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp292, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  5. Khanman, M. & Perry, M. & Reny, P.J., 1996. "An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism: Imperfect Information without Common Priors," Discussion Paper 1996-24, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Perry, M. & Reny, P.J., 1995. "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Papers 9581, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  7. Reny, P.J. & Winter, E. & Wooders, M.H., 1993. "The Partenered Core of a Game With Side Payments," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9317, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  8. Reny, P.J. & Bhattacharya, U. & Spiegel, M., 1993. "Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9318, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  9. McAfee, R. Preston & Reny, Philip J., 1990. "A Stone-Weierstrass Theorem without Closure under Suprema," Working Papers 727, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Articles

  1. Reny, P.J., 2008. "2004 World Congress Special Issue," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 431-434, July.
  2. R. McAfee & Philip Reny, 2007. "The role of excess capacity in determining market power in natural gas transportation markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 209-223, December.
  3. Philip J Reny & Motty Perry, 2006. "Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1231-1269, 09.
  4. Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2004. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1105-1125, 07.
  5. Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 2004. "Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 355-384, August.
  6. Reny, Philip J., 2003. "The Collected Papers of Robert J. Aumann: Robert J. Aumann, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000. Vol. 1, 720 pp; Vol. 2, 672 pp," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 327-332, February.
  7. Govindan, Srihari & Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 2003. "A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 369-374, November.
  8. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 2002. "An Efficient Auction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1199-1212, May.
  9. Reny, Philip J., 2001. "Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 99-105, January.
  10. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J., 1999. "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 279-285, January.
  11. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On The Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 895-900, July.
  12. Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
  13. Reny, Philip J. & Holtz Wooders, Myrna, 1998. "An extension of the KKMS theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 125-134, March.
  14. Kohlberg, Elon & Reny, Philip J., 1997. "Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 280-313, August.
  15. Reny, Philip J. & Holtz Wooders, Myrna, 1996. "The Partnered Core of a Game without Side Payments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 298-311, August.
  16. Harris, Christopher & Reny, Philip & Robson, Arthur, 1995. "The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 507-44, May.
  17. Philip J. Reny, 1995. "Rational Behaviour in Extensive-Form Games," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 1-16, February.
  18. Bhattacharya Utpal & Reny Philip J. & Spiegel Matthew, 1995. "Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 136-170, February.
  19. Elmes Susan & Reny Philip J., 1994. "On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-23, February.
  20. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
  21. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 257-274, April.
  22. Perry Motty & Reny Philip J., 1993. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 50-77, February.
  23. Philip J. Reny, 1992. "Rationality in Extensive-Form Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 103-118, Fall.
  24. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
  25. Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 627-49, May.
  26. Hellwig, Martin & Leininger, Wolfgang & Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 1990. "Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 406-422, December.
  27. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John & Reny, Philip J, 1989. "Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1451-59, November.
  28. Chow, Gregory C. & Reny, Philip J., 1985. "On two methods for solving and estimating linear simultaneous equations under rational expectations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-75, September.

NEP Fields

6 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2003-05-15 2005-09-19 2006-04-18 2009-12-19. Author is listed
  2. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2003-05-15
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2005-09-19 2006-03-19 2009-12-19. Author is listed

Statistics

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Average Rank Score
  2. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  3. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  4. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  6. Number of Citations
  7. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  8. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  9. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  10. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  16. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  17. h-index
  18. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  19. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  20. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  21. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  22. Wu-Index
  23. Strength of students

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