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An improved bound for the Shapley–Folkman theorem

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  • Budish, Eric
  • Reny, Philip J.

Abstract

We provide an up to 30% improvement in the Shapley–Folkman theorem error-bound, and briefly discuss its consequences for the course allocation problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Budish, Eric & Reny, Philip J., 2020. "An improved bound for the Shapley–Folkman theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 48-52.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:89:y:2020:i:c:p:48-52
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.04.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Starr, Ross M, 1969. "Quasi-Equilibria in Markets with Non-Convex Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(1), pages 25-38, January.
    2. Zhou, Lin, 1993. "A Simple Proof of the Shapley-Folkman Theorem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 371-372, April.
    3. Eric Budish, 2011. "The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(6), pages 1061-1103.
    4. Eric Budish & Gérard P. Cachon & Judd B. Kessler & Abraham Othman, 2017. "Course Match: A Large-Scale Implementation of Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Combinatorial Allocation," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(2), pages 314-336, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Th`anh Nguyen & Alexander Teytelboym & Shai Vardi, 2023. "Dynamic Combinatorial Assignment," Papers 2303.13967, arXiv.org.

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    Keywords

    Shapley–Folkman theorem; Error-bound;

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