On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 62 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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- Jose Penalva-Zuasti & Michael D. Ryall, 2003. "Causal Assessment in Finite-length Extensive-Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000074, David K. Levine.
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- Brandenburger, Adam & Friedenberg, Amanda, 2010. "Self-admissible sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 785-811, March.
- Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Ahti Pietarinen, 2003. "A Note on the Structural Notion of Information in Extensive Form Games," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 91-98, February.
- Voorneveld, Mark & Fagraeus Lundström, Helena, 2005. "Strategic equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 605, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Perea, Andrés, 2014. "Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 231-254.
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