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An Efficient Auction

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Author Info
Motty Perry () (Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, and Penn State University)
Philip J. Reny () (Department of Economics, University of Chicago)

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 70 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 1199-1212
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:70:y:2002:i:3:p:1199-1212

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  1. Jeffrey C. Ely & Kim-Sau Chung, 2004. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 169, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Ilya Segal, 2003. "Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 509-529, June. [Downloadable!]
  3. Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Implementation with Interdependent Valuations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001242, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002. "Informational Size and Efficient Auctions," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 13 Apr 2003. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2008. "A Double-Track Auction for Substitutes and Complements," KIER Working Papers 656, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Sergei Izmalkov, 2004. "Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction," Working Papers 2004.91, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  7. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2005. "The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation," UCLA Economics Working Papers 839, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Claudio Mezzetti, 2003. "Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition," Working Papers 2003.21, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  9. repec:bep:thecon:v:4:y:2004:i:1:p:1158-1158 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 142, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  11. repec:att:wimass:192019 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Jeffrey C. Ely & Kim-Sau Chung, 2002. "Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 1339, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  13. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2006. "An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 602-629, June. [Downloadable!]
  14. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu, 2008. "Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 469-490, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Sushil Bikhchandani, 2004. "The Limits of Ex Post Implementation Revisited," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000514, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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