Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Philip J. Reny

Download Info

To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 6 (1992)
Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
Pages: 103-18
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:6:y:1992:i:4:p:103-18

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research

Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Ken Binmore, . "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge," ELSE working papers 008, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
2. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 172, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, . "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 032, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
   • Dekel, E. & Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1999. "Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Papers 9-99, Tel Aviv.
   • Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1774, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   • Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, . "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 040, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
   • Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Perea, Andrés, 2006. "Nash Equilibrium as an Expression of Self-Referential Reasoning," Research Memoranda 035, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
4. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Oscar Volij, . "Field Centipedes," Economic theory and game theory 020, Oscar Volij. [Downloadable!]
5. Shinji Yamashige, 1995. "Bayesian Approach with Finite Hierarchies of Beliefs: Bounded Rationality in Strategic Form Games," Working Papers yamashig-95-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memoranda 047, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
7. Oliver Board, 2002. "Algorithmic Characterization of Rationalizability in Extensive Form Games," Working Papers 244, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2002. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Oliver Board, 2003. "Algorithmic Characterization of Rationalizability in Extensive Form Games," Economics Series Working Papers 148, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
8. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2008. "Non-cooperative Game Theory," Working Papers 08-6, University of California at Davis, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
9. Henry Van Egteren & Jianmin Tang, 1997. "Maxium Victim Benefit: A Fair Division Process in Transboundary Pollution Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(4), pages 363-386, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Duozhe Li, 2004. "Bargaining with History Dependent Preferences," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 516, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
11. Oliver Board, 2002. "The Deception of the Greeks: Generalizing the Information Structure of Extensive Form Games," Economics Series Working Papers 137, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
12. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memoranda 048, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]

Did you know? There are over 21000 authors registered on RePEc Author Service.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.