Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 65 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Other versions of this item:
- Reny, P.J. & Bhattacharya, U. & Spiegel, M., 1993. "Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9318, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
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