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Information Revelation and Market Incompleteness

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Author Info
José M. Marín ()
Rohit Rahi

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Abstract

\documentstyle[portada,11pt]{article} This paper shows that the presence of private information in an economy can be a source of market incompleteness even when it is feasible to issue a set of securities that completely eliminates the informational asymmetries in equilibrium. We analyze a simple security design model in which a volume maximizing futures exchange chooses not only the characteristics of each individual contract but also the number of contracts. Agents have rational expectations and differ in information, endowments and, possibly, attitudes toward risk. The emergence of complete or incomplete markets in equilibrium depends on whether the {\it adverse selection effect} is stronger or weaker than the {\it Hirshleifer effect}, as new securities are issued and prices reveal more information. When the Hirshleifer effect dominates, the exchange chooses an incomplete set of financial contracts, and the equilibrium price is partially revealing.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 145.

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Date of creation: Feb 1996
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:145

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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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Related research
Keywords: Incomplete markets; welfare; futures contracts; information revelation;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Bhattacharya Utpal & Reny Philip J. & Spiegel Matthew, 1995. "Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 136-170, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Norvald Instefjord & Kouji Sasaki, 2008. "Informational leverage: the problem of noise traders," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 455-480, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. José M. Marín & Jacques Olivier, 2007. "The dog that did not bark: Insider trading and crashes," Working Papers 2007-20, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Foucault, Thierry & Cespa, Giovanni, 2008. "Insiders-outsiders, transparency and the value of the ticker," Les Cahiers de Recherche 892, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Juan Carlos Hatchondo, 2005. "The value of information with heterogeneous agents and partially revealing prices," Working Paper 05-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
  5. José M. Marín & Rohit Rahi, 1997. "Speculative Securities," Economics Working Papers 223, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2007. "Bankruptcy: Is it enough to forgive or must we also forget?," Working Papers 07-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Juan Hatchondo, 2004. "The value of information with heterogeneous agents and partially revealing prices," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 175, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  8. Acharya, Viral V & Johnson, Tim, 2005. "Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives," CEPR Discussion Papers 5180, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Bhagwan Chowdhry & Mark Grinblatt & David Levine, 2002. "Information Aggregation, Security Design and Currency Swaps," NBER Working Papers 8746, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Marc-Andreas Muendler, 2005. "The Action Value of Information and the Natural Transparency Limit¤," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2005-09, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  11. Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 1996. "Information Acquisition and Entry," Economics Working Papers 155, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Bhagwan Chowdhry & Mark Grinblatt & David K Levine, 2001. "Information Aggregation, Currency Swaps, and the Design of Derivative Securities," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2106, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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