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The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization

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Author Info
Harris, Christopher
Reny, Philip
Robson, Arthur

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Abstract

The starting point of this paper is a simple, regular, dynamic game in which a subgame-perfect equilibrium fails to exist. Examination of this example shows that existence would be restored if players were allowed to observe the output of a public-randomization device. The main result of the paper shows that the introduction of public randomization yields existence not only in the example but also in a large class of dynamic games. It is also argued that the introduction of public randomization is the minimal robust extension of subgame-perfect equilibrium in this class of games. Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 63 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 507-44
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:63:y:1995:i:3:p:507-44

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