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An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction

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  • Motty Perry
  • Philip J. Reny
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    Abstract

    We provide an ascending auction that yields an efficient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward-sloping demand. Our ascending auction both extends and generalizes Ausubel's (2004) and yields the same outcome as Perry and Reny's (2002) generalization of Vickrey's (1961) sealed-bid auction. There are two key features of our auction. Bidders are permitted both to express different demands against different bidders, as well as to increase their demands. The equilibrium strategies are closely related to the familiar "drop out when price equals value" strategy of the English auction. Copyright 2005, Wiley-Blackwell.

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2005.00343.x
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.

    Volume (Year): 72 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 567-592

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    Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:72:y:2005:i:2:p:567-592

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    Cited by:
    1. Michal Bresky, 2009. "Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-Unit Uniform-Price Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague wp384, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
    2. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2006. "An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 602-629, June.
    3. Johan Swinnen & Pavel Ciaian & d’Artis Kancs, 2008. "Study on the Functioning of Land Markets in the EU Member States under the Influence of Measures applied under the Common Agricultural Policy," EERI Research Paper Series, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels EERI_RP_2008_04, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
    4. Andersson, Tommy & Erlanson, Albin, 2012. "Multi-Item Vickery-English-Dutch Auctions," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2012:17, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 15 Jan 2013.
    5. Albin Erlanson, 2014. "The Duo-Item Bisection Auction," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 43(1), pages 15-31, January.
    6. Dobzinski, Shahar & Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2012. "Multi-unit auctions with budget limits," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 486-503.
    7. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 990-999.

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