An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
AbstractWe provide an ascending auction that yields an efficient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward-sloping demand. Our ascending auction both extends and generalizes Ausubel's (2004) and yields the same outcome as Perry and Reny's (2002) generalization of Vickrey's (1961) sealed-bid auction. There are two key features of our auction. Bidders are permitted both to express different demands against different bidders, as well as to increase their demands. The equilibrium strategies are closely related to the familiar "drop out when price equals value" strategy of the English auction. Copyright 2005, Wiley-Blackwell.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 72 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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- Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2006. "An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 602-629, June.
- Johan Swinnen & Pavel Ciaian & d’Artis Kancs, 2008. "Study on the Functioning of Land Markets in the EU Member States under the Influence of Measures applied under the Common Agricultural Policy," EERI Research Paper Series EERI_RP_2008_04, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
- Dobzinski, Shahar & Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2012. "Multi-unit auctions with budget limits," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 486-503.
- Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 990-999.
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