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The partnered core of a game with side payments

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  • Philip Reny
  • Eyal Winter
  • Myrna Wooders

Abstract

An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. We show that the relative interior of the core of a game with side payments is contained in the partnered core. For quasi-strictly convex games the partnered core coincides with the relative interior of the core. When there are no more than three partnerships, the sums of the payoffs to partnerships are constant across all core payoffs. When there are no more than three players, the partnered core satisfies additional properties.
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  • Philip Reny & Eyal Winter & Myrna Wooders, 2012. "The partnered core of a game with side payments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 521-536, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:2:p:521-536
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0651-9
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    Cited by:

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    2. Yakar Kannai & Wooders, Myrna H., 1999. "A Further Extension of the KKMS Theorem," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 538, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    3. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2013. "The Farsighted Stable Set," Working Papers 2013-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    4. Luis Sanchez-Mier, 2005. "A Theory of Political Influence and Economic Organization," Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers EC200504, Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance.
    5. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2015. "The Farsighted Stable Set," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(3), pages 977-1011, May.
    6. Maria Montero & Alex Possajennikov, 2022. ""Greedy" Demand Adjustment in Cooperative Games," Discussion Papers 2022-05, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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