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The core-partition of a hedonic game

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  • Iehle, Vincent

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 54 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 176-185

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:54:y:2007:i:2:p:176-185

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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  1. Shao Sung & Dinko Dimitrov, 2007. "On Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 31-45, February.
  2. Le Breton,Michel & Owen,Guillermo & Weber,Shlomo, 1991. "Strongly balanced cooperative games," Discussion Paper Serie A 338, University of Bonn, Germany.
  3. Dinko Dimitrov & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx & Shao Sung, 2006. "Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 421-433, April.
  4. Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Vincent Iehle, 2004. "Payoffs-dependent Balancedness and Cores," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0403004, EconWPA.
  5. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Unique Stability in Simple Coalition Formation Games," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1537, Econometric Society.
  6. Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2003. "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 185-203, April.
  7. Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Jean-Jacques Herings, P., 2004. "A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 84-92, May.
  8. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, 2003. "Farsighted stability in hedonic games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 39-61, 08.
  9. Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Vincent Iehlé, 2007. "Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 678.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  10. Burani, Nadia & Zwicker, William S., 2003. "Coalition formation games with separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 27-52, February.
  11. Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
  12. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
  13. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1986. "Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 101-117, February.
  14. Mamoru Kaneko & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1982. "Cores of Partitioning Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 620, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  15. Zhou Lin, 1994. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 512-526, May.
  16. Reny, Philip J. & Holtz Wooders, Myrna, 1996. "The Partnered Core of a Game without Side Payments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 298-311, August.
  17. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Salvador Barberà & Carmen Beviá & Clara Ponsatí, 2014. "Meritocracy, Egalitarianism and the Stability of Majoritarian Organizations," Working Papers 737, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  2. Juan Cesco, 2012. "Hedonic games related to many-to-one matching problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 39(4), pages 737-749, October.
  3. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2011. "Bargaining cum voice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 199-225, February.
  4. Alparslan Gök, S.Z. & Branzei, O. & Branzei, R. & Tijs, S., 2011. "Set-valued solution concepts using interval-type payoffs for interval games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 621-626.
  5. Karakaya, Mehmet, 2011. "Hedonic coalition formation games: A new stability notion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 157-165, May.

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