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Coalition formation games with separable preferences

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Author Info
Burani, Nadia
Zwicker, William S.
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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V88-47RB8KW-2/2/4fd44bb375d4102898361bfc93ed7057
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 45 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 27-52
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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:45:y:2003:i:1:p:27-52

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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  1. Dinko Dimitrov & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx & Shao Chin Sung, 2004. "Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games," Working Papers 2004.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Alison Watts, 2007. "Formation of segregated and integrated groups," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 505-519, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Arlegi, Ritxar & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2008. "Dichotomous Preferences and Power Set Extensions," Discussion Papers in Economics 6431, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Dinko Dimitrov & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx, 2004. "Good and bad objects: the symmetric difference rule," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(11), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  5. Dimitrov, D. & Borm, P. & Hendrickx, R., 2003. "Good and bad objects: cardinality-based rules," Discussion Paper 49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Shao Sung & Dinko Dimitrov, 2007. "On Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 31-45, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Dimitrov, D. & Sung, S.C., 2004. "Enemies and friends in hedonic games : individual deviations, stability and manipulation," Discussion Paper 111, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Alison Watts, 2006. "Formation of Segregated and Integrated Groups," Working Papers 2006.127, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  9. Dinko Dimitrov & Shao Chin Sung, 2006. "A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games," Working Papers 2006.10, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Vincent Iehlé, 2005. "The core-partition of hedonic games," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b05091, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
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  11. Lazarova, Emiliya & Borm, Peter & Montero, Maria & Reijnierse, Hans, 2006. "A bargaining set based on external and internal stability and endogenous coalition formation," Discussion Paper 16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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