A Core-Partition Ranking Solution to Coalitional Ranking Problems
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-023-09832-2
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- Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal, 2023. "A Core-Partition Ranking Solution to Coalitional Ranking Problems," Post-Print hal-04114152, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Coalitional ranking problem; Social ranking; Core partition; Axiomatic characterization; Hedonic games;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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