Cores of Partitioning Games
AbstractA generalization of assignment games, called partitioning games, is introduced. Given a finite set N of players, there is an a priori given subset pi of coalitions of N and only coalitions in pi play an essential role. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the cores of all games with essential coalitions pi are developed. These conditions appear extremely restrictive. However, when N is "large," there are relatively few "types" of players, and members of pi are "small" and defined in terms of numbers of players of each type contained in subsets, then approximate cores are non-empty.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 620.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Feb 1982
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (1982), 3: 313-327
Note: CFP 566.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
More information through EDIRC
Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Other versions of this item:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin Shubik & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1982. "Approximate Cores of a General Class of Economies. Part I: Replica Games, Externalities, and Approximate Cores," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 618, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Henry, Claude, 1972. "Market Games with Indivisible Commodities and Non-convex Preferences," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 73-76, January.
- Dierker, Egbert, 1971. "Equilibrium Analysis of Exchange Economies with Indivisible Commodities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(6), pages 997-1008, November.
- Shubik, Martin, 1971. "The "Bridge Game" Economy: An Example of Indivisibilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(4), pages 909-12, July-Aug..
- Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Glena Ames).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.