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Approximate Cores of Games and Economies with Clubs

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  • Alexander Kovalenkov

    (University of North Carolina)

  • Myrna Holtz Wooders

    (University of Toronto and University of Warwick)

Abstract

This presentation focuses on new approachs to large games introduced in five papers by the authors (one with the same title as this abstract). In a new framework of parameterised collections of games with and without side payments, we provide nonemptiness of approximate core, a law of scarcity, and convergence results. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. Our nonemptiness theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. Our convergence results provide a new sort of application of standard theorems from linear programming. The results are applied to a model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows widespread externalities -- that is, the payoffs to members of a club may depend on the economy in which the club is situated.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 1790.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1790

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References

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  10. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1992. "Inessentiality of Large Groups and the Approximate Core Property: An Equivalence Theorem," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 129-47, January.
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  21. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1979. "A refinement of the core equivalence theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 307-310.
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  24. Martin Shubik & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1982. "Near-Markets and Market Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 657, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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  38. Hammond, Peter J. & Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 113-134, October.
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