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Anonymous Lindahl Pricing in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types

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  • John P. Conley
  • Myrna Holtz Wooders

Abstract

The ``crowding types'' model of a local public goods economy makes a distinction between crowding effects and tastes of agents. Decentralization of the core is possible both with anonymous admission prices that depend only on publicly observable information and, when technology is linear, with Lindahl (per unit) prices. Lindahl price systems are superior to admission prices since they can be specified with only a finite number of prices. Here, we show that the core is equivalent to the set of nonanonymous Lindahl equilibria, even with nonlinear technology. The core is generally larger, however, than the set of anonymous Lindahl equilibria.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number mwooders-98-02.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 11 Jun 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:mwooders-98-02

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  1. Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1982. "Cores of partitioning games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 313-327, December.
  2. John P. Conley & Myrna Wooders, 1998. "Anonymous Lindahl Pricing in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(4), pages 952-974, November.
  3. Boadway, Robin, 1980. "A note on the market provision of club goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 131-137, February.
  4. Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1992. "Large Games and Economies With Effective Small Groups," Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany 215, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Aug 1992.
  5. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
  6. Scotchmer, Suzanne & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1987. "Competitive equilibrium and the core in club economies with anonymous crowding," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 159-173, November.
  7. Martin Shubik & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1982. "Near-Markets and Market Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 657, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. Cole, Harold L. & Prescott, Edward C., 1997. "Valuation Equilibrium with Clubs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 19-39, May.
  9. Robert W. Helsley & William C. Strange, 1991. "Exclusion and the Theory of Clubs," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(4), pages 889-99, November.
  10. Vohra, Rajiv, 1990. "On the Inefficiency of Two-Part Tariffs," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 415-38, July.
  11. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1983. "The epsilon core of a large replica game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 277-300, July.
  12. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1988. "Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 29-49, February.
  13. Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1996. "The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 245-58.
  14. Kovalenkov, A. & Wooders, M.H., 1997. "Three Theorems on Non-Emptiness of Approximate Cores: Part 1. Game Theoretic Results," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 390.97, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  15. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1998. "Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 33-62, March.
  16. Berglas, Eitan & Pines, David, 1981. "Clubs, local public goods and transportation models : A synthesis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 141-162, April.
  17. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "A Tiebout theorem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 33-55, August.
  18. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna, 1996. "Taste-homogeneity of optimal jurisdictions in a Tiebout economy with crowding types and endogenous educational investment choices," Ricerche Economiche, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 367-387, December.
  19. Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1996. "Equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium with participation prices and the core (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 115-127.
  20. Shubik, Martin & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1983. "Approximate cores of replica games and economies. Part I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 27-48, October.
  21. Barham, V. & Wooders, M.H., 1994. "First and Second Welfare Theorems for Economies with Collective Goods," Working Papers, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics 9415e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  22. Wooders, Myrna, 1978. "Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 328-348, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. John P. Conley & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1995. "Anonymous Lindahl Pricing in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics mwooders-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  2. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Tiebout Economies with Differential Genetic Types and Endogenously Chosen Crowding Characteristics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 261-294, June.
  3. Bucovetsky, Sam & Glazer, Amihai, 2014. "Efficiency, equilibrium and exclusion when the poor chase the rich," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 166-177.
  4. John P. Conley & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1998. "The Tiebout Hypothesis: On the Existence of Pareto Efficient Competitive Equilibrium," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics mwooders-98-06, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  5. Sam Bucovetsky & Amihai Glazer, 2010. "Peer Group Effects, Sorting, and Fiscal Federalism," Working Papers 091006, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.

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