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Advances In The Theory Of Large Cooperative Games And Applications To Club Theory : The Side Payments Case

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Author Info
Kovalenkov, Alexander (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
Wooders, Myrna (University of Warwick)

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Abstract

In a series of papers (Kovalenkov and Wooders 2001a, Games and Economic Behavior, 2001b,Mathematics of Operations Research, and 1997, Journal of Economic Theory to appear), the authors have developed the framework of parameterized collections of games and also that of parameterized collections of economies with clubs. These papers apply to collections of games with nontransferable utility and similarly to economies with clubs and general preferences. The game theoretic framework encompasses the earlier `pregame' framework (cf., Wooders 1994b Econometrica) and also earlier models of economies with clubs and with possibly multiple memberships in clubs (cf. Shubik and Wooders 1982). In this paper, we consider the special case of games with side payments and illustrate the application of our more general results in this special, and much simpler but still important, framework. The motivation for this line of research is developed and application to environmental problems is discussed.

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Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 641.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:641

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Keywords: cooperative games ; clubs ; core ; approximate cores ; widespread externalities ; multiple memberships ; local public goods;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Tiebout Economies with Differential Genetic Types and Endogenously Chosen Crowding Characteristics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 261-294, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Anderson, Robert M, 1978. "An Elementary Core Equivalence Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1483-87, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1992. "Inessentiality of Large Groups and the Approximate Core Property: An Equivalence Theorem," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 129-47, January.
  5. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 678-84, Part I Se. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna H. Wooders, 1998. "Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs," Working Papers mwooders-00-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1996. "The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 245-58.
  8. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  9. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1994. "Equivalence of Games and Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1141-60, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kirman, Alan, 2007. "Introduction," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(S1), pages 1-7, November. [Downloadable!]
  11. Bennett, Elaine & Wooders, Myrna, 1979. "Income distribution and firm formation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 304-317, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna H., 1997. "Equivalence of the Core and Competitive Equilibrium in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 421-440, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Manelli, Alejandro M, 1991. "Monotonic Preferences and Core Equivalence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 123-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Allouch, Nizar & Wooders, Myrna, 2002. "Competitive Pricing In Socially Networked Economies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 639, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Ostroy, Joseph M, 1984. "A Reformulation of the Marginal Productivity Theory of Distribution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(3), pages 599-630, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999. "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economies," Papers 34-99, Tel Aviv.
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  18. Wooders, Myrna Holtz & Zame, William R, 1984. "Approximate Cores of Large Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1327-50, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna H. Wooders, 1999. "An explicit bound on epsilon for nonemptiness of Epsilon-cores of games," Working Papers mwooders-00-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  20. Shubik, Martin & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1983. "Approximate cores of replica games and economies. Part I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 27-48, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Anderson, Robert M., 1992. "The core in perfectly competitive economies," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 413-457 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Crawford, Vincent P & Knoer, Elsie Marie, 1981. "Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 437-50, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 1999. "Clubs and the Market," Discussion Papers 99-04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  25. Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1992. "Large Games and Economies With Effective Small Groups," Discussion Paper Serie B 215, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Aug 1992.
  26. Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1986. "The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 105-137, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Mamoru Kaneko & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1982. "Cores of Partitioning Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 620, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  28. Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 68, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
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  29. Demange, Gabrielle, 1994. "Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 45-58, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  30. Kannai, Yakar, 1992. "The core and balancedness," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 355-395 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997. "Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments," Working Papers mwooders-98-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  32. Kannai, Yakar, 1970. "Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(6), pages 791-815, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  33. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1983. "The epsilon core of a large replica game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 277-300, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  34. Le Breton, M & Owen, G & Weber, S, 1992. "Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 419-27.
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  35. Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 135-168, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  36. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  37. Hammond, Peter J., 1999. "On f-core equivalence with general widespread externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 177-184, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  38. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1979. "A refinement of the core equivalence theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 307-310. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  39. Wooders, Myrna, 1978. "Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 328-348, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  40. Demange, Gabrielle, 1982. "Single-peaked orders on a tree," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 389-396, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  41. Garratt, Rod & Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1996. "Cores and Competitive Equilibria with Indivisibilities and Lotteries," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 531-543, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  42. Hammond, Peter J. & Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 113-134, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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