Laws of scarcity for a finite game - exact bounds on estimations
AbstractA “law of scarcity” is that scarceness is rewarded. We demonstrate laws of scarcity for cores and approximate cores of games. Furthermore, we show that equal treatment core payoff vectors satisfy a condition of cyclic monotonicity. Our results are developed for parameterized collections of games and exact bounds on the maximum possible deviation of approximate core payoff vectors from satisfying a law of scarcity are stated in terms of the parameters describing the games. We note that the parameters can, in principle, be estimated. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 26 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (08)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna, 2003. "Laws of Scarcity for a Finite Game : Exact Bounds on Estimations," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 691, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition
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