An explicit bound on epsilon for nonemptiness of Epsilon-cores of games
AbstractWe consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all suffciently large games in the collection have non-empty epsilon-cores. Our result makes explicit the relationship between the required size of epsilon for non-emptiness of the epsilon-core, the parameters describing the collection of games, and the size of the total player set. Given the parameters describing the collection, the larger the game, the smaller the epsilon that can be chosen.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number mwooders-00-03.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 11 May 1999
Date of revision:
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cooperative games; games without side payments (NTU games); large games; approximate cores; effective small groups; parameterized collections of games.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-07-23 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques
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- Allouch, Nizar & Wooders, Myrna, 2002. "Competitive Pricing In Socially Networked Economies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 639, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Allouch, Nizar & Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 246-278, May.
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