A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures
AbstractWe study endogenous coalition formation in contexts where individual (and group) payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure that might form. We capture potential interaction across coalitions by means of a partition function.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 98-1.
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision: Jan 1998
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912
Other versions of this item:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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