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The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments

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Author Info
Kaneko, Mamoru
Wooders, Myrna Holtz

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Abstract

We prove the nonemptiness of the core of a continuum game without side payments where only small coalitions--ones bounded in absolute size of finite cardinality--are permitted. This result covers assignment games with a continuum of players and includes combinations of several assignment games, such as housing and automobile markets.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 25 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 245-58
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:245-58

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  2. Thomas Gall & Roland Amann, 2006. "How (not) to Choose Peers in Studying Groups," Working Papers 2006.79, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna H. Wooders, 1998. "Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs," Working Papers mwooders-00-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997. "An explicit bound on," Working Papers mwooders-98-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. John P. Conley & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1998. "The Tiebout Hypothesis: On the Existence of Pareto Efficient Competitive Equilibrium," Working Papers mwooders-98-06, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. John P. Conley & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1995. "Anonymous Lindahl Pricing in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types," Working Papers mwooders-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna, 2002. "Advances In The Theory Of Large Cooperative Games And Applications To Club Theory : The Side Payments Case," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 641, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna H. Wooders, 1999. "An explicit bound on epsilon for nonemptiness of Epsilon-cores of games," Working Papers mwooders-00-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew, 2002. "Assortative Matching in a Non-transferable World," CEPR Discussion Papers 3469, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1999. "An Explicit Bound on E For Nonemptimess of E-Cores of Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 537, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Nizar Allouch & John P. Conley & Myrna Wooders, 2008. "Anonymous Price Taking Equilibrium in Tiebout Economies with a Continuum of Agents; Existence and Characterization," Working Papers 0811, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  12. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997. "Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments," Working Papers mwooders-98-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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