Intermediate Preferences and Stable Coalition Structures
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series DELTA Working Papers with number 91-16.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1994, pp. 45-48
game theory ; efficiency ; economic models ; costs;
Other versions of this item:
- Demange, Gabrielle, 1994. "Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 45-58, January.
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