In a model of an economy with multiple public goods and differentiated crowding, it is shown that asymptotically the core has the equal treatment property and coincides with the equilibrium outcomes. It follows that all individuals of the same type in the same jurisdiction must pay the same Lindahl taxes and, with strict convexity of preferences, the same Lindahl prices. With only one private good, for sufficiently large economies we show (a) the equivalence of the core and the set of equilibrium outcomes and (b) the nonemptiness of approximate cores and their equivalence to the set of approximate equilibrium outcomes.
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 9 (1996) Issue (Month): 1 () Pages: 115-127 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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