Core equivalence with congested public goods
AbstractThis paper examines a model of an infinite production economy with a finite number of types of agents and semi-public goods, which are subjected to crowding and exclusion. The utility of an agent depends not only on the vector of public commodities produced by the coalition to which she belongs, but also on the mass of agents of her type who are the members of this coalition. The main purpose of the paper is to derive necessary and sufficient conditions on the local degrees of congestion which would guarantee the equivalence between the core and the set of equal treatment Lindahl equilibria. We prove that this equivalence holds if and only if there are constant returns to group size for each type of agents. It implies that linearity of each agent's congestion function with respect to the mass of the agents of her own type is necessary for the core equivalence to hold.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 6 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: September 27, 1993; revised version May 5, 1994
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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