Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition

Contents:

Author Info

  • Maria Graziano

    ()

  • Maria Romaniello

    ()

Abstract

We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods involving the choice of a public project. We discuss core-equivalence results in the general framework of non-Euclidean representation of the collective goods. We define a contribution scheme to capture the fraction of the total cost of providing the project that each blocking coalition is expected to cover. We show that for each given contribution scheme defined over the wider class of Aubin coalitions, the resulting core is equivalent to the corresponding linear cost share equilibria. We also characterize linear cost share equilibria in terms of the veto power of the grand coalition. It turns out that linear cost share equilibria are exactly those allocations that cannot be blocked by the grand coalition with reference to auxiliary economies with the same space of agents and modified initial endowments and cost functions. Unlike the Aubin-type equivalence, this characterization does not depend on a particular contribution scheme.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-010-0529-7
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 38 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 269-303

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:38:y:2012:i:2:p:269-303

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Dimitrios Diamantaras & Robert P. Gilles, 1997. "Linear cost sharing in economies with non-Samuelsonian public goods: Core equivalence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 121-139.
  2. Peter J. Hammond & Antonio Villar, . "Efficiency with Non-Convexities: Extending the "Scandinavian Consensus" Approaches," Working Papers 97036, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  3. Gilles, Robert P & Hahn, Kyungdong, 1999. " Economies with Multiple Public Projects," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 375-91.
  4. De Simone, Anna & Graziano, Maria Gabriella, 2004. "The pure theory of public goods: the case of many commodities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 847-868, November.
  5. Florenzano Monique, 1988. "Edgeworth equilibria, fuzzy core and equilibria of a production economy without ordered preferences," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8822, CEPREMAP.
  6. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Silvestre, Joaquim, 1989. "Cost share equilibria: A Lindahlian approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 239-256, April.
  7. Hervés-Beloso, Carlos & Moreno-Garci­a, Emma, 2008. "Competitive equilibria and the grand coalition," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 697-706, July.
  8. Achille Basile & Maria Gabriella Graziano & Maria Laura Pesce, 2010. "Mixed Markets with Public Goods," CSEF Working Papers 261, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 29 May 2012.
  9. Antonio Villar Notario & Peter Hammond, 1998. "- Valuation Equlibrium Revisited," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-24, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  10. Gilles, Robert P. & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1995. "Decentralization in Replicated Club Economies with Multiple Private Goods," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt22k559dk, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  11. Diamantaras, Dimitrios & Gilles, Robert P, 1996. "The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Dencentralization, and the Core," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 851-60, November.
  12. Noguchi, Mitsunori, 2000. "A fuzzy core equivalence theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 143-158, August.
  13. Valery Vasil'ev & Shlomo Weber & Hans Wiesmeth, 1991. "The Equivalence of Core and Lindahl Equilibria in an Economy with Semi-Public Goods," Discussion Paper Serie B 200, University of Bonn, Germany.
  14. Weber, Shlomo & Wiesmeth, Hans, 1991. "The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 180-197, June.
  15. Vasil'ev, Valery & Weber, Shlomo & Wiesmeth, Hans, 1995. "Core Equivalence with Congested Public Goods," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 373-87, November.
  16. Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Emma Moreno-García & Nicholas Yannelis, 2005. "Characterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 361-381, 08.
  17. Robert P. Gilles & Suzanne Scotchmer & Dimitrios Diamantaras, 1996. "Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs (☆)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 555-564.
  18. Schmeidler, David, 1972. "A Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 579-80, May.
  19. Diamantaras, Dimitrios & Gilles, Robert P & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1996. "Decentralization of Pareto Optima in Economies with Public Projects, Nonessential Private Goods and Convex Costs," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 555-64, October.
  20. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1980. "Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 625-41, June.
  21. Maria Gabriella Graziano, 2007. "Economies With Public Projects: Efficiency And Decentralization," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 1037-1063, 08.
  22. Hervés-Beloso, Carlos & Moreno-García, Emma, 2009. "Walrasian analysis via two-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 220-233, January.
  23. Vind, Karl, 1972. "A Third Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 585-86, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:38:y:2012:i:2:p:269-303. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.