Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Economies with Multiple Public Projects

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gilles, Robert P
  • Hahn, Kyungdong
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper discusses a general equilibrium model of an economy with multiple separately provided public projects. We assume an additively separable cost structure and consider valuation equilibria with separated finance systems, one for each collective good. Under non-Euclidean representation we show the decentralization of Pareto efficient allocations by valuation equilibria and the equivalence of the core and the set of nonnegative valuation equilibria. In the case of Euclidean representation, every Pareto efficient allocation is shown to be supported as an affine valuation equilibrium that is characterized by a personalized price per unit of each public good and a personalized lump sum tax or subsidy. These results complement and clarify already established insights into Lindahl pricing and its generalizations developed in the literature. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=jpet&volume=1&issue=3&year=1999&part=null
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 1 (1999)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 375-91

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:1:y:1999:i:3:p:375-91

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1097-3923

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Gilles, R.P., 1999. "Coalitional Provision of Pure Collective Goods," Discussion Paper 1999-47, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Maria Graziano & Maria Romaniello, 2012. "Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 269-303, February.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:1:y:1999:i:3:p:375-91. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.