The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Dencentralization, and the Core
AbstractThe authors extend the findings of Mas-Colell on valuation equilibria and the relationship of cost-share equilibria with the core. They allow for any finite number of private goods and a set of public projects without any structure. The authors show the two welfare theorems for valuation equilibrium, the inclusion of the set of cost-share equilibria in the core, and the nonequivalence of these two sets for an economy with a finite number of agents. Copyright 1996 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 37 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Other versions of this item:
- Dimitrios Diamantaras & Robert P. Gilles, 1994. "The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core," Public Economics 9403001, EconWPA.
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H - Public Economics
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Valery Vasil'ev & Shlomo Weber & Hans Wiesmeth, 1991.
"The Equivalence of Core and Lindahl Equilibria in an Economy with Semi-Public Goods,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
200, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Vasilev, V. & Weber, S. & Wiesmeth, H., 1991. "The Equivalence of Core and Lindahl Equilibria in an Economy with Semi- Public Goods," Papers 91-13, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
- Weber, Shlomo & Wiesmeth, Hans, 1991. "The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 180-197, June.
- Roberts, Donald John, 1974.
"A note on returns to group size and the core with public goods,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 350-356, November.
- Donald John Roberts, 1974. "A Note on Returns to Group Size and the Core with Public Goods," Discussion Papers 80, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Silvestre, Joaquim, 1989. "Cost share equilibria: A Lindahlian approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 239-256, April.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1980. "Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 625-41, June.
- Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "A Tiebout theorem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 33-55, August.
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