The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core
AbstractWe extend the results of Mas-Colell (1980) and Weber and Wiesmeth (1991) on valuation equilibria and the relationship of cost share equilibria with the core. We allow for any finite number of private goods and a set of public projects without any structure. We show the two welfare theorems for valuation equilibrium, the inclusion of the set of cost share equilibria in the core, and the nonequivalence of these two sets for an economy with a finite number of agents. In the case that the set of public projects is endowed with a topological structure, we provide conditions under which the price system needed to decentralize a Pareto efficient allocation as a valuation equilibrium is continuous.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 9403001.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 09 Mar 1994
Date of revision:
Note: 16 pages, LaTeX file, special macros included
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Other versions of this item:
- Diamantaras, Dimitrios & Gilles, Robert P, 1996. "The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Dencentralization, and the Core," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 851-60, November.
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H - Public Economics
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- Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1980. "Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 625-41, June.
- Valery Vasil'ev & Shlomo Weber & Hans Wiesmeth, 1991.
"The Equivalence of Core and Lindahl Equilibria in an Economy with Semi-Public Goods,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
200, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Vasilev, V. & Weber, S. & Wiesmeth, H., 1991. "The Equivalence of Core and Lindahl Equilibria in an Economy with Semi- Public Goods," Papers 91-13, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
- Weber, Shlomo & Wiesmeth, Hans, 1991. "The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 180-197, June.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Silvestre, Joaquim, 1989. "Cost share equilibria: A Lindahlian approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 239-256, April.
- Roberts, Donald John, 1974.
"A note on returns to group size and the core with public goods,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 350-356, November.
- Donald John Roberts, 1974. "A Note on Returns to Group Size and the Core with Public Goods," Discussion Papers 80, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "A Tiebout theorem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 33-55, August.
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