Share equilibrium in local public good economies
AbstractWe define a concept of share equilibrium for local public good (or club) economies where individual members of the population may have preferences over the membership of their jurisdiction. A share equilibrium specifies one share index for each individual. These indices determine each individual’s cost shares in any jurisdiction that he might join. We demonstrate that the same axioms as those that characterize the Lindahl equilibrium, as discussed in Lindahl’s 1919 paper, also characterize the share equilibrium. Share equilibrium extends the notions of ratio equilibrium and cost share equilibrium (due to Kaneko, 1977; Mas-Colell and Silvestre, 1989) to economies with a local public good and possibly multiple jurisdictions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
Share equilibrium; Ratio equilibrium; Axiomatization; Cost share equlilibrium; Local public good economy; Consistency; Club economy;
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