Strategy-proof mechanisms in public good economies
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 33 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Moreno, Diego & Walker, Mark, . "Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/4217, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1980. "Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 625-41, June.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Silvestre, Joaquim, 1989. "Cost share equilibria: A Lindahlian approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 239-256, April.
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1991. "Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 203-212, October.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Carmen Beviá & Luis C. Corchón, 2007.
"Cooperative Production and Efficiency,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
696.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., . "Cooperative production and efficiency," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/3545, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., . "Cooperative production and efficiency," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/739, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Carmen Bevià & Luis C. Corchón, 2007. "Cooperative Production and Effciency," Working Papers 305, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Carmen Bevia & Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "Cooperative production and efficiency," Economics Working Papers we070502, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Luis Corchón & José Rueda-Llano, 2008.
"Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 279-291, December.
- Corchón, Luis C. & Rueda-Llano, José, . "Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/3544, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Olszewski, Wojciech, 2004. "Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 88-114, January.
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