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Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences

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  • Le Breton, Michel
  • Weymark, John A.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 32 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
Pages: 47-85

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:32:y:1999:i:1:p:47-85

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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References

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  1. Yves Sprumont, 1995. "Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 68-107, February.
  2. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
  3. Le Breton, M. & Sen, A., 1995. "Strategyproofness and decomposability : Weak Orderings," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III 95a38, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  4. Border, Kim C & Jordan, J S, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 153-70, January.
  5. G. Chichilnisky & G. M. Heal, 1997. "The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games (*)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 259-294.
  6. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
  7. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  8. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  9. Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 107-19, January.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. John Weymark, 2011. "A unified approach to strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 529-550, December.
  2. Michel Breton & Vera Zaporozhets, 2009. "On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 287-309, August.
  3. Hidekazu Anno & Hiroo Sasaki, 2013. "Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 693-716, November.
  4. John A. Weymark, 2004. "Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics 0409, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
  5. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "A Characterization of Plurality-Like Rules Based on Non-Manipulability, Restricted Efficiency, and Anonymity," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS, University of Kansas, Department of Economics 200509, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2005.
  6. Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John, 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 143, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2003.
  7. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar & Torstensson, Pär, 2005. "Strategy-Proof Allocation of Multiple Public Goods," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2005:3, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 02 Feb 2007.
  8. Mishra, Debasis & Roy, Souvik, 2012. "Strategy-proof partitioning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 285-300.
  9. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 761.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  10. Alejandro Saporiti, 2008. "Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing," Wallis Working Papers, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy WP55, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  11. Yao, Haixiang & Yi, Jianxin, 2008. "A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 299-304, May.
  12. Reffgen, Alexander & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2012. "Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
  13. Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2011. "Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 143-149, March.

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