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Strategy-proof social choice

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  • Salvador Barberà

Abstract

This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 2, Edited by K. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 420.

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Date of creation: Jan 2010
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Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:420

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Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Social Choice; Dominant Strategies; Domain Restrictions; Voting;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2011. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics 784, Boston College Department of Economics.
  2. Diego Moreno & María Moscoso, 2013. "Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 315-336, January.
  3. Debasis Mishra & Souvik Roy, 2011. "Strategy-proof partitioning," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India 11-06, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
  4. Massó, Jordi & Moreno de Barreda, Inés, 2011. "On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 467-484, June.
  5. Borgers, Tilman & Smith, Doug, 2011. "Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules," MPRA Paper 37027, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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