This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Biung-Ghi Ju ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-005-0198-4
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 33 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (09)
Pages: 335-354
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:3:p:335-354

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F Baum).

Related research
Keywords: Plurality; Strategy-proofness; Efficiency; Restricted efficiency; Anonymity; Division indifference; Separable preferences; D70; D71;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 115-128, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Samet, Dov & Schmeidler, David, 2003. "Between liberalism and democracy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 213-233, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Kalai, Ehud & Megiddo, Nimrod, 1980. "Path Independent Choices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(3), pages 781-84, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Michel Le Breton & Arunava Sen, 1999. "Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 605-628, May.
  5. Ken-Ichi Shimomura, 1996. "Partially efficient voting by committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 327-342.
  6. Le Breton, M. & Sen, A., 1995. "Strategyproofness and decomposability : Weak Orderings," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a38, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  7. Inada, Ken-Ichi, 1969. "The Simple Majority Decision Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(3), pages 490-506, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Plott, Charles R & Levine, Michael E, 1978. "A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(1), pages 146-60, March.
  9. Ching, Stephen, 1996. "A Simple Characterization of Plurality Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 298-302, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Guha, Ashok, 1972. "Neutrality, Monotonicity, and the Right of Veto," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(5), pages 821-26, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. William Thomson, 2001. "On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 327-386. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Salvador Barberà, 2001. "An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 619-653. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 469-499, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Plott, Charles R, 1973. "Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1075-91, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John A., 1999. "Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 47-85, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS indexes over 800000 items of research in Economics alone.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.