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On the Equivalence of Coalitional and Individual Strategy-Proofness Properties

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  • Le Breton, Michel
  • Zaporozhets, Vera

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Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 408.

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Date of creation: Jul 2006
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Publication status: Published in Social Choice and Welfare, vol.�33, n°2, août 2009, p.�287-309.
Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:1700

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References

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  1. Barbera, Salvador, 1979. "A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 637-40, May.
  2. Barbera, S. & Gul, F. & Stacchetti, E., 1992. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 184.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. Kim, Ki Hang & Roush, Fred W., 1980. "Special domains and nonmanipulability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 85-92, September.
  4. Demange, Gabrielle, 1982. "Single-peaked orders on a tree," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 389-396, December.
  5. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
  6. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2002. "Strategy-proofness of social choice functions and non-negative association property with continuous preferences," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(8), pages 1-7.
  7. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997. "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 875-912, July.
  8. Cremer, Jacques, 1996. "Manipulations by Coalitions Under Asymmetric Information: The Case of Groves Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 39-73, March.
  9. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
  10. James Schummer & Rakesh V. Vohra, 1999. "Strategy-proof Location on a Network," Discussion Papers 1253, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Barbera, S. & Peleg, B., 1988. "Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 91.88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  12. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2002:i:8:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Salvador Barberà, 2001. "An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 619-653.
  14. Satterthwaite, Mark A & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 587-97, October.
  15. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  16. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 761.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  17. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  18. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
  19. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1979. "On Coalition Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 243-54, April.
  20. Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 107-19, January.
  21. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria II. Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 13-29, June.
  22. Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John A., 1999. "Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 47-85, August.
  23. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1507-20, September.
  24. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 305-25, April.
  25. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 1997. "Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1215-1220, September.
  26. Yves Sprumont, 1995. "Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 68-107, February.
  27. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
  28. E. Maskin, 1978. "Implementation and Strong Nash Equilibrium," Working papers 216, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ernesto Savaglio & Stefano Vannucci, 2014. "Strategy-proofness and single-peackedness in bounded distributive lattices," Papers 1406.5120, arXiv.org.
  2. Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet, 2010. "The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 10.01, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  3. Shuhei Morimoto & Shigehiro Serizawa & Stephen Ching, 2009. "A Characterization of the Uniform Rule with Several Commodities and Agents," ISER Discussion Paper 0769, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  4. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2010. "Strategy-proofness and weighted voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 15-23, July.
  5. Stefano vannucci, 2012. "Unimodality and equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness in convex idempotent interval spaces," Department of Economics University of Siena 668, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  6. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," Working Papers 420, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  7. Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2010. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1648-1674, September.
  8. John A. Weymark, 2011. "A Unified Approach to Strategy-Proofness for Single-Peaked Preferences," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1101, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  9. Shin Sato, 2010. "Circular domains," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 331-342, September.
  10. Ernesto Savaglio & Stefano Vannucci, 2012. "Strategy-proofness and unimodality in bounded distributive lattices," Department of Economics University of Siena 642, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  11. Vikram Manjunath, 2014. "Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 579-597, August.
  12. Sato, Shin, 2013. "A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 259-278.
  13. Manjunath, Vikram, 2012. "Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 239-242.

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