We study social choice functions for societies confronting alternatives which can be described as vectors in a Euclidean space, and where all voters have preferences on these alternatives which are saturated at an ideal point and satisfy an appropriate restriction of single-peakedness.
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Length: 1 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:inecpu:156
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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