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Euclidean Preferences, Option Sets and Strategy Proofness

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  • Bordes, G.
  • Laffond, G.
  • Le Breton, Michel
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    Abstract

    In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems.

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    File URL: http://www.tse-fr.eu/images/doc/wp/pe/wp_tse_302.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) in its series TSE Working Papers with number 12-302.

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    Date of creation: May 2012
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    Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:25811

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    1. Barbera, S. & Gul, F. & Stacchetti, E., 1992. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 184.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    2. Kim, K.H. & Roush, F.W., 1984. "Nonmanipulability in two dimensions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 29-43, August.
    3. Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Neme, A., 1992. "Voting Under Constraints," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 200.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    4. Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 107-19, January.
    5. Masso, J. & Barbera, S., 1996. "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists) 156, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
    6. Peters, Hans & van der Stel, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 1992. "Pareto Optimality, Anonymity, and Strategy-Proofness in Location Problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 221-35.
    7. James Schummer & Rakesh V. Vohra, 1999. "Strategy-proof Location on a Network," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1253, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Michel Le Breton & Arunava Sen, 1999. "Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 605-628, May.
    9. John A. Weymark, 1999. "Decomposable Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 50(3), pages 343-355, 09.
    10. Berga, D & Serizawa, S, 1996. "Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with one Public Good," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 353.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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