Voting by committees under constraints
AbstractWe consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 122 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Other versions of this item:
- Salvador Barberà & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2001. "Voting by Committees under Constraints," Working Papers 7, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Salvador Barberà & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2001. "Voting by Committees under Constraints," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 505.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 01 Jul 2003.
- Salvador Barbera & Jordi Masso & Alejandro Neme, 2000. "Voting by Committees Under Constraints," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1328, Econometric Society.
- Salvador BARBER? & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: email@example.com & Alejandro NEME, 2001. "Voting by Committees under Constraints," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 501.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990.
"Voting by Committees,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
941, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Masso, J. & Barbera, S., 1996.
"Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges,"
ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica
156, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
- Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 1997.
"Voting under Constraints,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 298-321, October.
- ASWAL, Navin & CHATTERJI, Shurojit & SEN, Arunava, 1999.
CORE Discussion Papers
1999040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993.
"Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December.
- Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2011.
Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 255-282, February.
- Massó, Jordi & Moreno de Barreda, Inés, 2011.
"On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 467-484, June.
- Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda, 2010. "On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-peakedness," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 809.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Reffgen, Alexander & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2012. "Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
- Chatterji, Shurojit & Roy, Souvik & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 353-366.
- Klamler, Christian & Pferschy, Ulrich & Ruzika, Stefan, 2012. "Committee selection under weight constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 48-56.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.