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Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics John A. Weymark () (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)
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A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on each person's report of his most-preferred alternatives on the range of this function. On many domains, strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property, provided that the range of the social choice function satisfies some regularity condition. The existing proofs of this result are model specific. In this article, a general proof strategy is proposed for showing that a strategy-proof social choice function satisfies the tops-only property when everyone has the same set of admissible preferences.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University in its series Working Papers with number
0409.
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Date of creation: Apr 2004Date of revision:
Sep 2006Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0409Contact details of provider: Postal: Box 1819, Station B, Nashville, TN 37235 Fax: 615-343-8495 Email: Web page: http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/econ/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diana Weymark).
Keywords: Social choice strategy-proofness option sets tops-only property Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Alejandro Saporiti, 2007.
"Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing ,"
Wallis Working Papers
WP48, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
[Downloadable!]
BOSSERT, Walter & WEYMARK, J.A., 2006.
"Social Choice: Recent Developments ,"
Cahiers de recherche
2006-01, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Alejandro Saporiti, 2008.
"Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing ,"
Wallis Working Papers
WP55, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
[Downloadable!]
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