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Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with one Public Good

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  • Berga, D
  • Serizawa, S

Abstract

In the context of the provision of one pure public good, we raise the following question : how large can a preference domain be to allow for the existence fo strategy-proof rules satisfying the no vetoer condition? This question is qualified by the additional requirement that a domain should include " a minimal rich domain". We discuss that this requirement is weak since the conditions for minimal richness are satisfied by a variety of small domains including the class of quadratic preferences.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 353.96.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:353.96

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Keywords: PUBLIC GOODS; ECONOMIC MODELS;

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References

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  1. Serizawa Shigehiro, 1995. "Power of Voters and Domain of Preferences Where Voting by Committees Is Strategy-Proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 599-608, December.
  2. Border, Kim C & Jordan, J S, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 153-70, January.
  3. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  4. Ehud Kalai & Eitan Muller, 1977. "Characterization of Domains Admitting Nondictatorial Social Welfare Functions and Nonmanipulable Voting Procedures," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 234, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December.
  6. Barbera, S & Masso, J & Serizawa, S, 1996. "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 358.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  7. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
  8. Ching, Stephen & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 1998. "A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 157-166, January.
  9. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
  10. Berga, Dolors, 1998. "Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 105-120, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  2. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 828.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó, 2014. "Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 946.14, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  4. Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "Scoring Rules on Dichotomous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 617.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  5. Jordi MassóAuthor-Name: Alejandro Neme, . "Maximal Domain Of Preferences In The Division Problem," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 434.99, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. Shuhei Morimoto, 2013. "Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 637-669, September.
  7. Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro Neme, 2002. "A Maximal Domain of Preferences for Tops-only Rules in the Division Problem," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 535.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  8. Jordi Massé & Inés Moreno de Barreda, 2010. "On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-Peakedness," Working Papers 421, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  9. Kentaro Hatsumi & Dolors Berga & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2014. "A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 153-168, February.
  10. Susumu Cato, 2011. "Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 503-518, October.
  11. Georges Bordes & Gilbert Laffond & Michel Le Breton, 2011. "Euclidean preferences, option sets and strategyproofness," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 469-483, December.
  12. Bordes, G. & Laffond, G. & Le Breton, Michel, 2012. "Euclidean Preferences, Option Sets and Strategy Proofness," IDEI Working Papers 717, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  13. Ehlers, Lars, 2001. "Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 239-250, March.
  14. Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda, 2010. "On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-peakedness," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 809.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  15. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 298-317, August.
  16. Chatterji, Shurojit & Sanver, Remzi & Sen, Arunava, 2013. "On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1050-1073.
  17. Bordes, G. & Laffond, G. & Le Breton, Michel, 2012. "Euclidean Preferences, Option Sets and Strategy Proofness," TSE Working Papers 12-302, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

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