In the context of the provision of one pure public good, we raise the following question : how large can a preference domain be to allow for the existence fo strategy-proof rules satisfying the no vetoer condition? This question is qualified by the additional requirement that a domain should include " a minimal rich domain". We discuss that this requirement is weak since the conditions for minimal richness are satisfied by a variety of small domains including the class of quadratic preferences.
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Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number
353.96.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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