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On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-peakedness

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  • Jordi Massó

    ()

  • Inés Moreno de Barreda

    ()

Abstract

We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 809.10.

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Length: 32
Date of creation: 05 Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:809.10

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Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Single-peaked Preferences; Median Voter; Feasibility Constraints.;

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References

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  1. Weingast, Barry R. & Wittman, Donald, 2008. "The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199548477.
  2. Salvador Barberà & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2001. "Voting by Committees under Constraints," Working Papers 7, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  3. Border, Kim C & Jordan, J S, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 153-70, January.
  4. Berga, D & Serizawa, S, 1996. "Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with one Public Good," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 353.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  5. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," Working Papers 420, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  6. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 761.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  7. Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet, 2010. "The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 10.01, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  8. Salvador Barberà, 2001. "An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 619-653.
  9. Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S., 1998. "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 272-291, November.
  10. Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 113-131.
  11. Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Neme, A., 1992. "Voting Under Constraints," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 200.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  12. Bettina Klaus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 1998. "Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 297-311.
  13. Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990. "Voting by Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 941, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  14. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  15. Peters, Hans & van der Stel, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 1992. "Pareto Optimality, Anonymity, and Strategy-Proofness in Location Problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 221-35.
  16. Nehring, Klaus & Puppe, Clemens, 2007. "Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 132-153, April.
  17. Anirban Kar & Özgür Kıbrıs, 2008. "Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 641-666, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. John Weymark, 2011. "A unified approach to strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 529-550, December.
  2. Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Alejandro Neme, 2013. "Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems: The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 941.13, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. Shuhei Morimoto, 2013. "Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 637-669, September.

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