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Pareto Optimality, Anonymity, and Strategy-Proofness in Location Problems

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  • Peters, Hans
  • van der Stel, Hans
  • Storcken, Ton

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 21 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 221-35

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:3:p:221-35

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Cited by:
  1. Bettina Klaus, 2001. "Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 13-29, August.
  2. Georges Bordes & Gilbert Laffond & Michel Le Breton, 2011. "Euclidean preferences, option sets and strategyproofness," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 469-483, December.
  3. Stefan Maus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2006. "Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 27-43, January.
  4. Bordes, G. & Laffond, G. & Le Breton, Michel, 2012. "Euclidean Preferences, Option Sets and Strategy Proofness," TSE Working Papers 12-302, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  5. Massó, Jordi & Moreno de Barreda, Inés, 2011. "On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 467-484, June.
  6. Bordes, G. & Laffond, G. & Le Breton, Michel, 2012. "Euclidean Preferences, Option Sets and Strategy Proofness," IDEI Working Papers 717, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  7. Dutta, Bhaskar & Peters, Hans & Sen, Arunava, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 392-416, October.
  8. Nehring, Klaus, 2007. "The impossibility of a Paretian rational: A Bayesian perspective," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 45-50, July.
  9. van der Stel, Hans, 2000. "Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 277-301, May.
  10. Nehring, Klaus & Puppe, Clemens, 2007. "Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 132-153, April.
  11. Ernesto Savaglio & Stefano Vannucci, 2014. "Strategy-proofness and single-peackedness in bounded distributive lattices," Papers 1406.5120, arXiv.org.
  12. Klaus Nehring, 2005. "The (Im)Possibility of a Paretian Rational," Economics Working Papers 0068, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.

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