Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets
AbstractIn a model with a continuum of voters with symmetric single-peaked preferences on the one-dimensional unit interval (representing the political spectrum) a voting rule assigns to each profile of votes a point in the interval. We characterize all voting rules that are strategy-proof, anonymous, Pareto optimal, and which satisfy a weak form of continuity. This result paves the way for studying cabinet formation rules. A cabinet is an interval which has obtained sufficiently many votes. The main result on cabinet formation is a characterization of all cabinet formation rules that are strategy-proof with respect to the endpoints of the cabinet, anonymous, Pareto optimal, and continuous. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 126 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Other versions of this item:
- Maus,Stefan & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2003. "Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets," Research Memorandum 044, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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