Choice correspondences for public goods
AbstractWe consider collective choice problems where a group of agents has to decide on the location of a public facility in a Euclidean space. A well-known solution for such problems is the coordinatewise median of the reported votes and additional fixed ballots. Instead of adding ballots, we extend the median solution by allowing set-valued outcomes. This especially applies for location problems with an even number of agents.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received: 14 August 1998/Accepted: 29 August 2000
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- Bochet, Olivier & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 53-68, January.
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