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Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences

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  • Hans Peters

    ()

  • Souvik Roy

    ()

  • Ton Storcken

    ()

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    Abstract

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s13209-011-0048-5
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Spanish Economic Association in its journal SERIEs.

    Volume (Year): 2 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 485-496

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:series:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:485-496

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    Related research

    Keywords: Strategy-proof voting; Continuum of voters; Multidimensional policy space; Elliptic preferences; D71; D72;

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    1. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 761.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    2. Maus,Stefan & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2003. "Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets," Research Memoranda 044, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
    3. Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 107-19, January.
    4. Yves Sprumont, 1995. "Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 68-107, February.
    5. Border, Kim C & Jordan, J S, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 153-70, January.
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