Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions with Binary Ranges and Arbitrary Domains: Characterization Results
AbstractWe define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. We characterize the social choice functions that satisfy each one of the mand whose ranges consist of two alternatives, in terms of two types of basic properties.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 448.
Date of creation: Apr 2010
Date of revision:
Social choice functions; Binary ranges; group strategy-proofness; xy-monotonicity; xy-based rules;
Other versions of this item:
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2012. "Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 791-808, November.
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2010. "Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 853.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Manjunath, Vikram, 2012. "Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 239-242.
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009.
"Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
761.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2010. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1648-1674, September.
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Individual versus group strategy proofedness: when do they coincide?," Working Papers 372, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Larsson, Bo & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2006. "Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 272-287, December.
- Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
- Peters Hans & Roy Souvik & Storcken Ton, 2010. "Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences," Research Memoranda 064, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Stefano Vannucci, 2013. "On two-valued nonsovereign strategy-proof voting rules," Department of Economics University of Siena 672, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
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