Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Salvador Barberà
  • Dolors Berga
  • Bernardo Moreno

Abstract

A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of definition. For the same reason, different conditions may be equivalent for functions defined on some domains, while different in other cases. Understanding the role of domains is therefore a crucial issue in mechanism design. We illustrate this point by analyzing the role of different conditions that are always related, but not always equivalent to strategy-proofness. We define two very natural conditions that are necessary for strategy-proofness: monotonicity and reshuffling invariance. We remark that they are not always sufficient. Then, we identify a domain condition, called intertwinedness, that ensures the equivalence between our two conditions and that of strategy-proofness. We prove that some important domains are intertwined: those of single-peaked preferences, both with public and private goods, and also those arising in simple models of house allocation. We prove that other necessary conditions for strategy-proofness also become equivalent to ours when applied to functions defined on intertwined domains, even if they are not equivalent in general. We also study the relationship between our domain restrictions and others that appear in the literature, proving that we are indeed introducing a novel proposal.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://research.barcelonagse.eu/tmp/working_papers/598.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 598.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:598

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005 Barcelona
Phone: +34 93 542-1222
Fax: +34 93 542-1223
Email:
Web page: http://www.barcelonagse.eu
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: strategy-proofness; reshuffling invariance; monotonicity; intertwined domains;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
  2. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-15, February.
  3. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 298-317, August.
  4. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September.
  5. Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2009. "Tops-Only Domains," Macroeconomics Working Papers 22064, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  6. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
  7. Paula Jaramillo & Vikram Manjunath, 2011. "The Difference Indifference Makes in Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects," DOCUMENTOS CEDE, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE 008746, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  8. Navin Aswal & Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2003. "Dictatorial domains," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 45-62, 08.
  9. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Individual versus group strategy proofedness: when do they coincide?," Working Papers 372, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  10. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar, 1982. "Implementability via protective equilibria," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 49-65, June.
  11. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
  12. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  13. Ehud Kalai & Eitan Muller, 1977. "Characterization of Domains Admitting Nondictatorial Social Welfare Functions and Nonmanipulable Voting Procedures," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 234, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. ALCALDE-UNZU, Jorge & MOLIS, Elena, 2009. "Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2009062, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2001. "Locating libraries on a street," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 527-541.
  16. Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December.
  17. Carmen Bevi? & Salvador Barber?, . "Self-Selection Consistent Functions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 468.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  18. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjöström & Takehiko Yamato, 2004. "Secure Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000615, UCLA Department of Economics.
  19. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
  20. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Deb, Rajat & Ehlers, Lars, 2005. "Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 161-186, August.
  21. Shin Sato, 2010. "Circular domains," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 331-342, September.
  22. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  23. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O. & Neme, Alejandro, 1997. "Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-21, January.
  24. David Cantala, 2004. "Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 491-514, 06.
  25. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:598. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruno Guallar).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.