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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 14 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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