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Characterization of Domains Admitting Nondictatorial Social Welfare Functions and Nonmanipulable Voting Procedures

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Ehud Kalai
Eitan Muller

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/234.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 234.

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Date of creation: Apr 1977
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:234

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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sen, Amartya & Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1969. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for rational choice under majority decision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 178-202, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Ehud Kalai, 1976. "Social Welfare Functions When Preferences are Convex and Continuous: Impossibility Results," Discussion Papers 236, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ehud Kalai & Zvi Ritz, 1978. "Characterization of the Private Alternative Domains Admitting Arrow Social Welfare Functions," Discussion Papers 341, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Keisuke Sato & Yoshitsugu Yamamoto, 2006. "A Study on Linear Inequality Representation of Social Welfare Functions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-022/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  3. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1979. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 395, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Bochet,Olivier & Storcken,Ton, 2006. "Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules," Research Memoranda 002, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990. "Voting by Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 941, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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    • Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Storcken Ton, 2008. "Collective Choice Rules on Convex Restricted Domains," Research Memoranda 003, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  7. Teo Chung Piaw & Jay Sethuraman & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2001. "Integer Programming and Arrovian Social Welfare Functions," Discussion Papers 1316, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ehud Kalai & Zvi Ritz, 1978. "An Extended Single Peak Condition in Social Choice," Discussion Papers 325, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  9. James Schummer & Rakesh V. Vohra, 1999. "Strategy-proof Location on a Network," Discussion Papers 1253, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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