A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
AbstractFollowing Barbera, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy-proofness and no-vetoer.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University in its series ISER Discussion Paper with number 0809.
Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision: Feb 2013
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- Alejandro Neme & Jordi MassÔ & Salvador BarberÁ, 1999. "Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 321-336.
- Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990.
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Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
941, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Shuhei Morimoto, 2013. "Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 637-669, September.
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