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Menu mechanisms

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  • Mackenzie, Andrew
  • Zhou, Yu

Abstract

We investigate menu mechanisms: dynamic mechanisms where at each history, an agent selects from a menu of his possible assignments. We consider both ex-post implementation and full implementation for a strengthening of dominance that covers off-path histories, and provide conditions under which menu mechanisms provide these implementations of rules. Our results cover a variety of environments, including matching with contracts, labor markets, auctions, school choice, marriage, object allocation, and elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:204:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122001016
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105511
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    Cited by:

    1. Catonini, Emiliano & Xue, Jingyi, 2020. "Local Dominance," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 1-2021, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
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    2. Gian Caspari & Manshu Khanna, 2021. "Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets," Papers 2111.06815, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Menu mechanism; Strategy-proofness; Robust implementation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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